Chemical weapons are internationally banned under the
Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter, “
the Convention”), a multilateral agreement that places legally binding obligations of an unlimited duration on its States Parties. Scientific and technological considerations informed the negotiation of the Convention, and full and effective treaty implementation relies on technical knowledge and capability. Indeed, scientific principles underpin and inform
the Convention’s key articles, the definitions of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals, the modalities of verification and compliance, and the provision of assistance and training in critical implementation capabilities. Science also provides a sound technical basis to inform deliberations and decisions of chemical disarmament policymakers. Yet, unlike the prohibitions enshrined in the Convention,
science and technology are dynamic, continually evolving in trans-disciplinary, convergent, and non-linear ways. Modalities for the implementation of an international disarmament and nonproliferation regime are influenced and informed by the technological and sociopolitical understandings at the time of treaty negotiation. Likewise, the scientific and technological dimensions of the agreement reflect and support its negotiated objectives. Scientific evolution however, changes how we think about and apply scientific knowledge, adopt new technologies, and view the potential for technologically enabled challenges to weapons of mass destruction security, all of which impacts the implementation of the Convention. The Convention reflects negotiations informed by the world of Cold War era military chemical weapon programs. While 21st century non-compliance concerns include individuals targeted with chemical warfare agents, small scale deployment of chemicals, including those not subject to the Convention’s special verification provisions (e.g., chlorine gas) as seen in the conflict in Syria, allegations of the use of riot control agents in State-to-State conflicts, and compliance concerns related to the weaponization of pharmaceutical-based chemicals. Non-State entities, including terrorists seeking to acquire, and in some cases actually deploy, chemical weapons further complicate the current chemical security environment. These issues reflect quite different scenarios than those of military chemical weapon stockpiling and large-scale battlefield use during the Cold War. Science and technology factor into deliberations around these concerns, presenting opportunities to adopt new tools and enhanced capabilities for chemical defense and confidence building in treaty compliance, as well as potentially lowering barriers to developing and gaining access to chemical weapons. While the Convention mandates its implementing body, the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to consider measures to make use of
advances in science and technology in undertaking its verification activities, scientific advances are all too often seen through a lens of being a challenge to chemical disarmament and nonproliferation by opening up pathways for acquiring chemical weapons, which might take forms unfamiliar to our current concepts of what a chemical weapon and/or a chemical weapon production process looks like. Balancing these views, ensuring that the Convention remains fit-for-purpose, and understanding the true potential of scientific advances vs. “hype” of what they can do (in both beneficial and security concerning ways), requires a degree of scientific literacy among the policymakers. In the face of rapid technological change, limited access to scientific knowledge and information places decision-makers at a disadvantage. Staying abreast of scientific advances and understanding their impact is a necessary component of ensuring
the Convention remains relevant into the future. The need for consideration of scientific dimensions in policymaking is recognized within the Convention, where States Parties are called on to consider
scientific and technological developments when reviewing its operation. The Convention also provides for a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), which serves as an independent subsidiary body, to allow the OPCW Director-General to render specialized advice to OPCW’s policymaking organs and the Member States.13 The SAB supports this process by reviewing and reporting on
developments in science and technology for the five-yearly Review Conferences of the Convention and providing advice on specific topics when requested by the Director-General. In the sections of this paper that follow, the science and technology considerations of the Convention, its “science advice ecosystem”, the function of the SAB, and how SAB advice informs the work of the OPCW is explored, along with the benefits and limitations that arise from a scientific advisory operating within a multilateral treaty forum.
Scientific and technological change is inevitable, the drafters of
the Convention knew this to be true and given its importance, provided a mandate to establish the
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). Watching and reviewing scientific change is a daunting task, accomplishing this effectively benefits from a trans-disciplinary perspective that considers fundamental definitions and the needs of the Convention for guiding deliberations on science and technology. The
SAB has had over 25 years to establish its working processes and credibility. The provision of scientific advice is just the beginning of a process to consider the impacts of science and technology on the Convention and take forward looking decisions. This process necessarily involves the OPCW itself and those making decisions on the implementation of
the Convention, this further benefits from processes that give the
SAB visibility and interaction with recipients of the Board’s advice. Without this engagement, the hurdles for adopting and consideration of the advice grow larger. For the Convention to remain relevant in the face of technological change, implementation must stay abreast of new developments that could affect its operation. This ensures those implementing
the Convention are adequately prepared to support efforts in chemical disarmament and nonproliferation through understanding chemical processes and applications as a system, recognizing and understanding how new technologies relevant to the Convention are adopted and deployed, and maintaining foundational knowledge and capabilities for countering chemical threats that ensure the treaty remains fit-for-purpose. These efforts are trans-disciplinary. They require engagement with a wide range of scientific communities (and civil society more broadly, as scientific trends and drivers of change are influenced by societal needs) to keep abreast of developments and the capabilities they enable to maintain a productive science-policy maker dialogue. In closing, there is much uncertainty that arises with scientific and technological change.
Chemical disarmament and nonproliferation cannot afford to approach this from a position of fear. Scientific developments provide opportunities to benefit the Convention and its implementation, especially in the face of scientific change that raises security concerns, and practical scientific advice benefits all of the Convention’s stakeholders.
- PROGRAMME -
Promoting Chemistry for Peace: The programme focus on the need for strengthening economic and technological development through capacity building, facilitating exchanges of chemicals information.
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