Looking ahead: adapting verification strategies to the 21st century landscape.

OPCW inspector training on using a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

Over 25 years after its entrance into force, the CWC remains a strong treaty, thanks in no small part to its robust verification regime. Key factors that contribute to the verification regime’ robustness include the general purpose criterion, which ensures that any present and future chemical weapon threats are squarely within the scope of the Convention’s ban; the breadth of verification mechanisms, which cover a wide range of possible violation scenarios; and the role of the Science Policy Adviser and the Scientific Advisory Board in keeping the OPCW abreast of science and technology developments. In the summer of 2023, the CWC achieved a pivotal milestone towards its disarmament objective: with the completion of the destruction of the United States’ chemical stockpiles, all chemical stockpiles declared by the States Parties at the time of their ratification or accession to the Convention—a staggering 72,304 metric tonnes of agents—have been successfully eliminated. Moreover, all of the declared chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes in accordance with the Convention’s mandates. As the chemical disarmament operations conclude, the activities of the OPCW Verification andInspectorate divisions related to them are expected to significantly decrease. This situation provides an opportunity to strengthen the verification regime related to the nonproliferation and counterproliferation objectives of the Convention and to maintain and enhance the operational preparedness of the Technical Secretariat in support of these objectives. Increase the focus on unscheduled chemicals. As mentioned, the CWC Schedules are crucial for the Convention’s nonproliferation objective, being a fundamental component of the verification regime related to activities not prohibited by the Convention. To be sure, they are not intended and should not be construed as constituting a comprehensive list of chemical weapon agents. Pursuant to the general purpose criterion established by Article II of the Convention, any toxic chemical is subject to the CWC’s ban unless intended for purposes not prohibited by the treaty. However, the chemicals covered by the CWC Schedules have a special status that goes beyond being subject to declaration requirements that, especially for Schedule1 chemicals andSchedule 2 chemicals, are more stringent than those that apply to OCPFs. In direct relation to the verification regime, the chemicals in the CWC Schedules are the primary focus of OPCW inspectors and the OPCW Laboratory, and they form the basis for the proficiency tests of OPCW-designated laboratories. Moreover, the chemicals in the CWC Schedules are excluded from the CWC definition of riot control agents and constitute the backbone of national export control lists of CWC States Parties. The key issue is that the CWC Schedules were crafted with 20th century chemical weapons in mind. Since the Convention’s entry into force in 1997, they have been updated only once, following the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal with a Novichok nerve agent in 2018 in Salisbury. A thorough assessment of the Schedules to identify toxic chemicals and precursors that should be added to them would be in order. However, despite the pressing need to update the CWC Schedules, it is undoubtful that it will be difficult to accomplish such a task in the current geopolitical context. Moreover, it must be recognized that we live in a rapidly evolving world, with profound advancements in science and technology significantly propelled by increasingly capable AI systems, ever-increasing computing power (including the expected coming to fruition of quantum computing), enhanced automation, 3D printing, and an unprecedented availability of information. Hence, it is fundamental to adopt a flexible approach that allows to quickly pivot as the threat evolves. Rather than updating the CWC Schedules, a more politically feasible and nimbler approach would be to shift some of the attention away from them and realign the focus of the OPCW and the CWC States Parties with the present chemical weapons threats with minimal or no amendments to the Schedules. Without amending the Schedules, it would be good for the OPCW and OPCW-designated laboratories to increase their focus on unscheduled chemicals of concern and, if needed, expand their analytical and forensic chemistry capabilities in this area. The fact that unscheduled Novichok agents were promptly identified by OPCW-designated laboratories in the context of the poisonings of the Skripals in 2018 and of Alexei Navalny in 2020 is a very encouraging indication of their preparedness to address the threat posed by unscheduled chemicals.The progress made with analytical chemistry techniques for the identification of exposure to chlorine, an unscheduled chemical that has been extensively used in the context of the Syrian Civil War, is also encouraging.  The OPCW and OPCW States Parties should continue expanding their technical expertise to cover a wide range of chemical threats, extending well beyond the CWC Schedules. These efforts should include leveraging and vigorously supporting the work of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board and of civil society experts in the fields of forensics and analytical chemistry, including those from academia and industry. Monetary contributions from States Parties that are staunch proponents of the CWC will be fundamental to enable the OPCW to leverage the expertise of civil society. Beyond the verification regime, it is also of fundamental importance to keep monitoring the field of riot control agents to identify unscheduled chemicals that are incompatible with such use. The 2021 decision from the Conference of States Parties regarding the understood incompatibility of the aerosolized use of chemicals that act on the central nervous system (CNS) for law enforcement purposes is encouraging. The studies on riot control agents conducted by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board are also encouraging. These efforts should continue. Furthermore, regarding export controls, individual States Parties should also actively monitor their export control lists to ensure that they include all chemicals currently recognized as posing a chemical weapons threat, even if they are not covered by the CWCSchedules. Harnessing AI and information technology. Exploring ways in which AI and information technology can be harnessed to enhance the effectiveness of the verification regime is absolutely crucial. By integrating advancements in AI and information technology, the OPCW can improve the monitoring, detection, and analysis of violations of the Convention’s mandates. This technological integration will not only streamline verification processes but also enhance the capability to predict and respond to possible violations, more efficiently distinguishing them from legitimate activities. Leveraging AI for a more risk-focused verification approach can help prioritize inspections where the risk of violation is higher, ensuring resources are allocated more effectively. While there are few doubts that AI could enhance the chemical weapons programs of state actors and, perhaps, some advanced non-state actors as well, it is equally capable of significantly bolstering efforts to counter such programs. This potential of AI represents an important strategic opportunity that should not be overlooked. Also in this case, it will be important to leverage and vigorously support the work of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board and of civil society experts, including those from academia and industry, with monetary contributions from States Parties that are staunch proponents of the CWC. A very encouraging step in this direction is the AI Challenge recently launched by the OPCW. Funded by the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the AI Challenge seeks to give grants to researchers and scientists to propose AI-based solutions that can facilitate themission of the OPCW. Routinizing challenge inspections. It is obvious that an effective verification regime cannot solely rely on mandatory declarations by States Parties, also in consideration of the fact that many chemicals of concern often have legitimate uses, for instance in the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, it is essential to make full use of the mechanisms designed for verifying suspected violations. Challenge inspections, intended to address suspicions of violations involving the development rather than the actual use of chemical weapons (as per Part X of the Verification Annex), are of crucial importance. This is especially due to the challenges and dangers inherent to conducting Investigations of Alleged Use, particularly when the alleged use occurs in war theaters or other high-risk zones. Notoriously, following the chemical attack in Douma, Syria, in April 2018 a UN security team came under fire, delaying the OPCW inspectors’ access to the incident sites by two weeks, thus significantly complicating the investigation. This underscores the need to address chemical weapons threats before they materialize into actual chemical weapons use. Article IX clearly delineates the challenge inspection mechanism as a counterproliferation tool designed to address suspected violations. Notably, paragraph 9 calls for caution, stating that “Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse.” However, there has been excessive reluctance to utilize this instrument: it is a fact that, despite its availability, the challenge inspection mechanism has yet to be invoked. Willingness to utilize this mechanism is absolutely crucial to ensuring that substances are not diverted towards prohibited activities. Importantly, challenge inspections remain a viable option even in the current geopolitical landscape, as they can be initiated at the request of individual States Parties. Governments often receive intelligence on activities conducted by other States Parties in violation of their obligations under the CWC. When the confidence level in this intelligence is sufficiently high and the information is circumstantiated enough to pinpoint the location of the alleged violation, challenge inspections should be initiated. The CWC’s stipulation to refrain from unfounded requests should not be interpreted as implying that a challenge inspection should only be requested if a violation has definitively occurred. Instead, challenge inspections should be initiated based on a well-founded suspicion of illegitimate activities. Challenge inspections should not be expected to frequently uncover violations. Their primary function should be that of resolving reasonable doubts, serving the valuable purpose of maintaining the integrity and trust in the compliance process and acting as a deterrent against proliferation. Ultimately, the challenge inspection mechanism should come to be regarded not exclusively as a counterproliferation tool but also as a nonproliferation mechanism. Such a paradigm shift implies that States Parties should be prepared and willing to undergo challenge inspections themselves, as a commitment to transparency and adherence to the Convention’s principles.