Capacity Building to Prevent and Respond to Chemical Terrorism.

 

National implementation of CWC provisions.

When comparing expectations of national implementation formulated in the treaty text to the actual implementation track record by CWC States Parties over the past 26 years, a continuing discrepancy between expectations formulated in the treaty and state party behavior is observable. First measures that sought to improve national implementation date back to 2003 when the Conference of the States Parties in October of that year agreed upon a corresponding action plan. At that time, about 60% of State Parties had submitted a declaration to the OPCW under CWC Article VII (5) and about a third indicated that they had legislation in place covering all key areas of CWC implementation. While the implementation gap has narrowed since then, many State Parties’ record is still far from satisfactory, with around 70 of 193 lacking implementing legislation that would cover all areas key to enforcing the Convention. One of the reasons for this gap may lie in some persistent misconceptions about the CWC. Yet, enacting national implementing legislation is only the first step in being able to enforce CWC provisions domestically. Not having these available seriously hampers further steps by State Parties such as ensuring the legal accountability of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, for potential violations of the provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, the absence of implementing legislation can limit the capacity building measures that a state party can receive from the OPCW, including in the area of preparedness and protection against CW. 

Assistance and protection. 

Already the first Secretariat paper on chemical terrorism in 2001 included implementation of the assistance and protection norms expressed in Article X for consideration by the Executive Council. The Director-General at the time suggested increasing the readiness of the OPCW to provide “effective and timely assistance to victims of chemical weapons use, in order to save human lives and to reduce human suffering, while striving to minimize the impact of terrorist chemical attacks.” OPCW activities in this regard would complement those of CWC State Parties under Article X and include the provision of emergency assistance and protection to any state party that is exposed to or threatened with chemical weapons. Importantly, Art. X (8) does not distinguish between a state and a non-state perpetrator. Assistance provided by State Parties may take the form of a financial contribution to a voluntary fund managed by the OPCW. Member states could also donate certain items of chemical defense equipment either on a bilateral basis or through the Organisation. In addition, Article X stipulates that within 24 hours after the receipt of a request for assistance, the OPCW Director-General must launch an investigation of the alleged chemical attack, irrespective of the type of perpetrator, to establish relevant facts “to provide foundation for further action.” So far, no state party has requested an investigation of alleged use, by state or non state actor, under Article X of the Convention. The OPCW is thus involved in different ways in implementing the assistance norm, alongside State Parties, who under Article X are both entitled to request such assistance and obliged to provide it. Numerous assistance activities have taken place over the years most of which have targeted specific groups of stakeholders in CWC State Parties. In addition, more complex and sophisticated exercises have been added to the portfolio of Article X activities, such as the CHEMEX Africa exercise in Algeria in September/ October 2023, or the table top exercise in November 2023 on the premises of the new ChemTech Centre.