Banning chemical weapons without hindering peaceful chemistry requires an effective verification regime.

 

Since its entry into force in 1997, the CWC has imposed a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, defined succinctly as weaponized toxic chemicals along with any munitions and devices designed for the dissemination of such chemicals. As outlined in Article I, the Convention prohibits not only their use but also their development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and retention. The ban extends to engaging in military preparations to use chemical weapons and to providing support to those who intend to engage in activities prohibited by the CWC. Additionally, the CWC mandates that States Parties destroy all their chemical weapons and related facilities, including those abandoned on the territory of another State Party, and prohibits the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. Looking at the flip side of the coin, it must be recognized that the potential diversion of chemistry towards chemical warfare is only a marginal ramification of the broader field. Indeed, chemistry and chemicals are fundamentally vital to the development and economy of any country. Chemicals and chemistry pervade all facets of modern life, providing essential medicines, materials, and technological solutions that enhance and sustain our daily existence. Chemistry and chemicals are the quintessential embodiment of dual-use technologies and materials. They have legitimate, beneficial uses that make them indispensable for humanity. Yet, they can also be diverted towards malevolent purposes, including purposes related to chemical weapons. For these reasons, while imposing such comprehensive prohibitions and mandates, the CWC also strives not to hinder legitimate chemical activities. Above all, it does so by establishing a set of activities not prohibited by the Convention. These activities, clearly delineated in Article II, include peaceful industrial, agricultural, research, medical, and pharmaceutical applications. They also include measures meant to provide protection against chemical weapons, military applications not involving exploiting the toxicity of chemicals for warfare purposes, and law enforcement uses, including domestic riot control. Furthermore, in Article XI, the Convention explicitly states that its prohibitions “shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties, and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities…”. To reconcile the comprehensive ban that it imposes on chemical weapons with the dual-use nature of chemistry, a rigorous verification regime is codified in the CWC. Given the sheer impracticality and undesirability of banning chemistry and chemicals outright, the CWC verification regime is crucial to promote and foster their peaceful uses while simultaneously verifying that they are not employed to develop, maintain, or implement chemical weapons programs. Moreover, a strong verification regime benefits international chemical trade by allowing States Parties to trade chemicals with confidence, knowing that trading partners are not engaged in activities that violate the Convention’s mandates. Regrettably, the treaty has been violated multiple times in recent years and noncompliance issues have been raised, underscoring the need to maintain and strengthen the verification regime. In the sections below, the CWC verification regime and its implementation by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW are described. Subsequently, possible courses of action that could be taken to enhance the verification regime are discussed.

UN Security Council