Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare

  Chemical weapons are internationally banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter, “ the Convention ”), a multilateral agreement that places legally binding obligations of an unlimited duration on its States Parties. Scientific and technological considerations informed the negotiation of the Convention, and full and effective treaty implementation relies on technical knowledge and capability. Indeed, scientific principles underpin and inform the Convention ’s key articles, the definitions of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals, the modalities of verification and compliance, and the provision of assistance and training in critical implementation capabilities. Science also provides a sound technical basis to inform deliberations and decisions of chemical disarmament policymakers. Yet, unlike the prohibitions enshrined in the Convention, science and technology are dynamic, continually evolving in trans-disciplinary, convergent, and non-linear ways. Modalities for th...

Operational implementation of the Convention requires that inspectors and those tasked with verification, monitoring, and capacity building (training) activities are equipped with foundational technical knowledge and the specialized capabilities and equipment required to recognize characteristics of toxic chemicals and the signs and signatures of their presence and exposures, understand chemical manufacturing processes and what the process equipment and work flow indicates about the nature of the chemicals being produced, neutralize and destroy chemical agents, and perform and interpret chemical analysis. This requires knowledge and skill sets that go beyond the science of chemistry and includes the ability to infer information from purely observational assessments such as identifying a type or class of toxic chemical from the presentation of a toxidrome in an exposed human or animal. Given the potential for OPCW staff (inspectors and others) to be called upon to deploy at short notic...

  The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) is a valuable resource that provides guidance and recommendations to the OPCW. It must, however, be appreciated that the SAB is an independent advisory body whose members meet in their individual capacity multiple times a year to review and discuss scientific issues impacting the Convention. The members do this outside their regular jobs and positions. If SAB advice moves forward, it is ultimately the OPCW and/or its Member States that lead and advance the efforts. In this regard, OPCW exists in a complex environment where science, security, policy, and international relations intersect. Decisions are never purely technical, and there is always a risk that scientific advice can be taken out of context and used for political arguments. The SAB’s benefits the OPCW and its stakeholders by providing advice and credible scientific assessments for the Convention . The SAB’s impact is influenced by the visibility and credibility of the Board amongst ...

  For more than 20 years, the issue of terrorist acquisition and use of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the OPCW and its Member States. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, against the United States and the anthrax letters sent through the US mail system shortly thereafter triggered a swift response by the OPCW. In early November the Director General submitted a note for the December 2001 Executive Council session, which contains an analysis of the provisions of the CWC “which apply to the danger of the terrorist use of chemical weapons, with a view to assisting in the development of an action plan for the OPCW’s contribution to the global struggle against terrorism.”  The paper identified CWC universality, the full implementation of the CW destruction norm (CWC Articles IV and V), Article VI (on activities not prohibited), the internalization norm expressed in Article VII, the assistance and protection provisions under Article X, and the international coo...

According to International Relations scholars MichaelBarnett and Martha Finnemore , classification andattribution of meaning is one of the functions ofinternational organizations , in addition to those tasks that member states have explicitly delegated to them. The above mentioned EC decision in late 2001 falls into this category as it defines nonstate actors, such as terrorists acquiring and using CW, as falling within the scope of the CWC and the OPCW’s work. It also clarifies that the full and effective implementation of the Convention has the “double benefit” of supporting the global fight against terrorism. Subsequent action falling into this category took the form of discussion papers issued by the Technical Secretariat and their discussion by the OEWG-T sub-working group on non-state actors in 2015 and 2016. These papers have focused on “the topics of the legal accountability of non-state actors under the Convention […] ; measures to prevent the hostile use of toxic chemicals […...

  Statements about fast-paced technological change and the challenges this can bring to Convention are frequently made, begging the question of what should be monitored and reviewed. With much of the operational aspects of the Convention built around its verification regime and the routine declarations and inspections that the OPCW undertakes, developments related to chemical industry, the adoption and integration ofemerging technologies (and especially the rise ofartificial intelligence (AI) and automation in chemical industry , e.g., “Industry 4.0”) would certainly be relevant. In Industry 4.0, technologies and advanced data analytics (e.g., AI) are integrated into production and business processes, these technologies can include Internet of Things (IoT) devices, additive manufacturing, and automation/robotic systems. Understanding how such technologies are adopted and integrated into chemical production processes provides insight into what is required to use such systems and t...

  National implementation of CWC provisions. When comparing expectations of national implementation formulated in the treaty text to the actual implementation track record by CWC States Parties over the past 26 years, a continuing discrepancy between expectations formulated in the treaty and state party behavior is observable. First measures that sought to improve national implementation date back to 2003 when the Conference of the States Parties in October of that year agreed upon a corresponding action plan. At that time, about 60% of State Parties had submitted a declaration to the OPCW under CWC Article VII (5) and about a third indicated that they had legislation in place covering all key areas of CWC implementation. While the implementation gap has narrowed since then, many State Parties’ record is still far from satisfactory, with around 70 of 193 lacking implementing legislation that would cover all areas key to enforcing the Convention. One of the reasons for this gap may ...

  The  Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)  benefits greatly from its mandated scientific advisory mechanism . The SAB serves to inform policy makers and the OPCW itself on the impact of scientific change and provides advice on how this might be considered for treaty implementation. The SAB met for its first session in 1998, and over the years since this initial event, it has seen changes in direction and focus, that mirror in many ways the dynamic nature of scientific evolution . These changes in reflect the needs of OPCW in the context of its operating environments and year to year priorities, the arrival and departure of SAB members bringing all of whom bring with unique skills and knowledge to share among the Board (SAB members can serve on the Board for up to six years), and the requests and guidance from the Director-General and the OPCW Staff members who have facilitated the Board’s work (there have been five individuals since 1998 who served as Secretary to the SAB...

  The United Nations is the premier international organization to secure international peace and security. Cooperation between the UN and OPCW has as its foundation the relationship agreement that the two international organizations had already concluded in 2000. The OPCW Conference of the States Parties approved the agreement in May 2001, and it entered into force later that year. It distinguishes five main areas of cooperation. The first three of these are identified in the CWC treaty text itself: paragraph 36 of CWC Article VIII, paragraph 4 of CWC Article XII (both of which concern grave cases of violations of the CWC which shall be reported to the UN), and paragraph 27 of Part XI of the CWC Verification Annex. The latter two would become relevant in the initial investigation of reported CW use in Syria in early 2013, before that country became a state party to the CWC. The remaining two areas identified by the UN-OPCW relationship agreement concern cooperation in the provision...

In order to preserve and enhance the OPCW’s role in the global fight against terrorism, the Organisation should:  • Monitor and further adapt to the evolving international security environment, especially with respect to the threat of chemical terrorism. This will likely require the OPCW to gradually adjust its approach to the threat or use of CW by terrorist groups, depending on their acquisition and use strategies as well as the technological sophistication with which they pursue a chemical weapons capability.  • Continue the regular exchanges and expand interagency coordination with the UN and other international organizations in order to be able to respond swiftly to changes in the international security environment, as they pertain to terrorist acquisition and use of CW. This may also require a repositioning and redefinition of the OPCW’s role vis-à-vis the UN and other international organizations in this context.  • Regularize and refine its approach to capacity b...

  The OPCW has established itself as a leading actor in the global fight against chemical terrorism and undertakes various capacity building activities under the Convention that have the “double benefit” of not only supporting treaty implementation but also contributing to the global fight against terrorism.  This notwithstanding, NGOs could support the OPCW in this role by:  • Highlighting the fact that chemical terrorism is real—as evidenced by the most recent IIT report on chemical attacks in Marea, Syria in 2015—and victims of such terrorist acts should be included in the OPCW’s broader efforts to support victims of CW use.  • Contributing to a broader understanding of (1) the Organization’s leading role in discussions on and action against chemical terrorism and (2) and its continuing suitability in fulfilling that role. The sometimes-proposed alternative legal instruments or actors to take over this role are only detracting attention away from the many useful c...

  The verification regime applies to the Convention ’s disarmament objective, chiefly through the oversight of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and facilities. It applies to the Convention’s nonproliferation objective, through the oversight of the veracity of activities not prohibited by the Convention, such as industrial uses. Furthermore, it applies to the Convention’s counterproliferation objective, through the investigation of suspected violations. Chemical weapons disarmament: verificationregime related to the destruction of chemical weapons (CWC Articles III, IV, and V). To maximize States Parties’ adherence to their chemical disarmament obligations, a rigorous process of declarations and verification is applied. This process includes not only existing chemical weapons stockpiles but also old and abandoned chemical weapons. The declaration requirements, detailed in Article III, set the groundwork for compliance. Article IV directly mandates the destruction of d...