Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare

  The OPCW Technical Secretariat , headquartered in The Hague, is tasked with facilitating the implementation of the Convention. Two of its divisions, the Verification Division and the Inspectorate Division , are central to the administration and operation of the verification regime. Moreover, the International Cooperation and Assistance Division supports States Parties in their efforts to meet their obligations under the Convention. The OPCW Laboratory, a part of the Technical Secretariat’s Verification Division, backs the Convention’s verification regime by maintaining advanced sampling and analytical technologies functional to both routine inspections and field missions. Moreover, it shares with the Inspectorate Division training and certification responsibilities for analytical chemist inspectors. The OPCW Laboratory is located in the OPCW Centre for Chemistry andTechnology , a state-of-the-art facility just outside of The Hague that was inaugurated in 2023 and is commonly re...

OPCW inspector training on using a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) Over 25 years after its entrance into force, the CWC remains a strong treaty, thanks in no small part to its robust verification regime . Key factors that contribute to the verification regime’ robustness include the general purpose criterion, which ensures that any present and future chemical weapon threats are squarely within the scope of the Convention’s ban; the breadth of verification mechanisms , which cover a wide range of possible violation scenarios; and the role of the Science Policy Adviser and the Scientific Advisory Board in keeping the OPCW abreast of  science and technology developments. In the summer of 2023, the CWC achieved a pivotal milestone towards its disarmament objective: with the completion of the destruction of the United States’ chemical stockpiles, all chemical stockpiles declared by the States Parties at the time of their ratification or accession to the Convention—a st...

  Since its entry into force in 1997, the CWC has imposed a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, defined succinctly as weaponized toxic chemicals along with any munitions and devices designed for the dissemination of such chemicals. As outlined in Article I, the Convention prohibits not only their use but also their development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and retention. The ban extends to engaging in military preparations to use chemical weapons and to providing support to those who intend to engage in activities prohibited by the CWC. Additionally, the CWC mandates that States Parties destroy all their chemical weapons and related facilities, including those abandoned on the territory of another State Party, and prohibits the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. Looking at the flip side of the coin, it must be recognized that the potential diversion of chemistry towards chemical warfare is only a marginal ramification of the broader field. Indeed, chemi...

  Chemical weapons are internationally banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter, “ the Convention ”), a multilateral agreement that places legally binding obligations of an unlimited duration on its States Parties. Scientific and technological considerations informed the negotiation of the Convention, and full and effective treaty implementation relies on technical knowledge and capability. Indeed, scientific principles underpin and inform the Convention ’s key articles, the definitions of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals, the modalities of verification and compliance, and the provision of assistance and training in critical implementation capabilities. Science also provides a sound technical basis to inform deliberations and decisions of chemical disarmament policymakers. Yet, unlike the prohibitions enshrined in the Convention, science and technology are dynamic, continually evolving in trans-disciplinary, convergent, and non-linear ways. Modalities for th...

Operational implementation of the Convention requires that inspectors and those tasked with verification, monitoring, and capacity building (training) activities are equipped with foundational technical knowledge and the specialized capabilities and equipment required to recognize characteristics of toxic chemicals and the signs and signatures of their presence and exposures, understand chemical manufacturing processes and what the process equipment and work flow indicates about the nature of the chemicals being produced, neutralize and destroy chemical agents, and perform and interpret chemical analysis. This requires knowledge and skill sets that go beyond the science of chemistry and includes the ability to infer information from purely observational assessments such as identifying a type or class of toxic chemical from the presentation of a toxidrome in an exposed human or animal. Given the potential for OPCW staff (inspectors and others) to be called upon to deploy at short notic...

  The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) is a valuable resource that provides guidance and recommendations to the OPCW. It must, however, be appreciated that the SAB is an independent advisory body whose members meet in their individual capacity multiple times a year to review and discuss scientific issues impacting the Convention. The members do this outside their regular jobs and positions. If SAB advice moves forward, it is ultimately the OPCW and/or its Member States that lead and advance the efforts. In this regard, OPCW exists in a complex environment where science, security, policy, and international relations intersect. Decisions are never purely technical, and there is always a risk that scientific advice can be taken out of context and used for political arguments. The SAB’s benefits the OPCW and its stakeholders by providing advice and credible scientific assessments for the Convention . The SAB’s impact is influenced by the visibility and credibility of the Board amongst ...

  For more than 20 years, the issue of terrorist acquisition and use of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the OPCW and its Member States. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, against the United States and the anthrax letters sent through the US mail system shortly thereafter triggered a swift response by the OPCW. In early November the Director General submitted a note for the December 2001 Executive Council session, which contains an analysis of the provisions of the CWC “which apply to the danger of the terrorist use of chemical weapons, with a view to assisting in the development of an action plan for the OPCW’s contribution to the global struggle against terrorism.”  The paper identified CWC universality, the full implementation of the CW destruction norm (CWC Articles IV and V), Article VI (on activities not prohibited), the internalization norm expressed in Article VII, the assistance and protection provisions under Article X, and the international coo...